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This paper examines the adequacy and the consistency of the fiscal rule set by the Treaty of 
Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact. First, it shows that the functional fiscal rule is 
adequate in ensuring the final goal of public debt sustainability. Second, it points out that the 
draw of an arbitrary numerical value is indifferent to reach the final goal even if produces 
different intergenerational distribution of public debt burden. Finally, it shows that the updated 
numerical fiscal rule of Stability and Growth Pact removes the inconsistency of the previous 
numerical fiscal rule – arising for a given set of value of GDP – embodied in the Treaty of 
Maastricht but at the same time it implies that in the long period public debt has to be retired 
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1. Introduction 
The first significant slowdown in the economic activity during the 2001-2003 period, 
and the consequent budget balance difficulties arisen in the EU area after the launch in 
1997, have put the Fiscal Policy Framework of the European Union (FPF-EU) – which 
crops up by the Treaty of Maastricht (TM) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
joined together – through the hoops and have revived the economic and political debate 
on its strengths and weaknesses.  
In close succession the European Commission recommended the European 
Council to initiate the excessive deficit procedure for several countries: for Portugal (on 
5 November 2002), for Germany (on 21 January 2003) and finally for France (on 3 
June). On the one hand with respect to Portugal, the excessive deficit procedure was 
terminated by the Commission on 7 April 2004 in front of the Portuguese effective 
budgetary consolidation measures. On the other hand in the early November 2003 the 
Commission recommended the Council to impose financial sanctions on Germany and 
France whose deficits result above the 3 per cent limit for the third consecutive years. 
Notwithstanding the Commission advice the ECOFIN on 25 November 2003 took a 
decision in favour France and Germany which both was breaking their targets and 
therefore did not implement the Commission recommendation. Actually the ECOFIN 
simply recommended  to Germany and France to correct their deficits outside the 
framework of the SGP so as to drastically and substantially undermine the credibility of 
the entire FPF-EU. 
The FPF-EU has taken form by the spread of a long two-phases process. In 1992 
the TM has prescribed the entry requirements for EU membership: the Treaty qualified 
European country for EU membership as long as it had satisfied four criteria and, 
among them, it had ensured the sustainability of its finance position. Actually the TM 
does not expressly define the meaning of sustainability but simply required the country 
by 1997 to meet two numerical fiscal reference values. The first one represented the 
numerical fiscal rule regulating the government's interventions: the total public budget 
balance GDP ratio has not to exceed the reference value of -3%. The second one was 
the numerical final goal: the public debt GDP ratio had not to exceed the reference  4
value of 60%.  
In 1997 the SGP refined upon the architecture of the FPF-EU laying down the 
consolidation requirements for EU member to retain a solid and lasting balanced 
budgetary positions and, therefore, to keep public debt sustainable. According to the 
further requirements, EU countries have to achieve in the medium-term structural 
budgets that are close to balance or in surplus. Furthermore the SGP allows the actual 
public budget balance to overrun the reference value of 0% on the left hand side up to 
the safeguard limit of 3% behind which, unless there happens an annual decline in real 
output of more than 2%, public budget balances become excessive and therefore the 
country is subject to financial penalties and public approbation. Indeed SGP marked a 
significant tightening of requirements for ensuring public debt sustainability because of 
the shift of the reference value from -3% to 0% towards which countries have to 
converge. 
In conclusion, the FPF-EU is defined by three basic elements: i) a numerical fiscal 
rule which imposes countries to converge in the mid-term towards a structural public 
budget balance equal to 0%; ii) an element of flexibility in the management of fiscal 
policy represented by the safeguard ceiling of -3% that marks off inferiorly the 
fluctuation interval within which the actual total budget balance is constricted and, 
finally, iii) the fixing of a final goal, defined by an interval, according to which the public 
debt should converge or not exceed the limit of 60%.  
The aim of this paper consists firstly in coming out the theoretical support of two 
basic features of the fiscal rules embodied in the FPF-EU i.e., its adequacy and 
consistency with respect to the final goal represented by the sustainability of public debt 
and, subsequently, in highlighting the social costs deriving from their application. In 
section 2 we briefly sketch the survey of recent literature on three aspects of the FPF-
EU: its rationale, the scope of fiscal policy, and finally the fiscal rules embodied in the 
SGP. In section 3, after reminding the standard definition of public debt sustainability 
we contrast three alternative variables for defining fiscal rules: public debt, primary 
budget balance and total budget balance. By contrasting the three alternatives we 
conclude that the functional fiscal rule based on a constant total budget balance is more  5
adequate than others choices. Of course, the draw of the numerical value from the 
functional fiscal rule inevitably is an arbitrary operation. In section 4 we examine the 
social cost of choosing one value rather an other one where the social cost is measured 
in term of public debt burden borne by generations. Actually if on the one hand the 
numerical fiscal rule which is drawn from the functional fiscal rule is indifferent with 
respect to the public debt sustainability on the other hand it produces different effects 
with respect to the intergenerational redistribution of public debt burden. Finally in 
section 5 we examines the issue of the consistency of the numerical fiscal rule of FPF-
EU on the total budget balance with the numerical final goal on the public debt. 
 
2. The survey on recent SGP research 
In this section we report the recent research relatively to three aspects of the FPF-EU: 
the underlying rationale, the specific scope of fiscal policy and finally the meaning and 
the role of the fiscal rule established by the FPF-EU
1.  
 
2.1. The rationale 
With respect to the constitutive rationale behind the FPF-EU there is a broad 
agreement that the latter has been reckoned to be a system of political and economic 
effective regulations for disciplining public budget balance and, therefore, achieving the 
final goal of preventing public debt unsustainability. Indeed the avoidance of the 
excessive accumulation of public debt is corroborated by both the historical experience 
in Europe during the seventies and the eighties, and recent and remote theoretical 
findings. On the one hand the high and increasing public deficits pursued by some 
shortsighted and opportunist European government from the early 70's up to the early 
90's, set public debt going over the psychological 100% mark. On the other hand the 
fiscal theory of the price level (Woodford, 1994, 1995) – that lays down its roots in the 
seminal work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) – reaffirms that the current and 
                                                 
1 For an extensive discussion on the rationale, the modus operandi and the procedural aspects of the SGP 
see Brunila, Buti and Franco (2001),  Artis (2003), Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003), Giudice and Montanino 
(2003).   6
intertemporal public budget constraints produce an indissoluble interdependence 
between fiscal and monetary policies which, in the long-run, could produce unpleasant 
repercussions on price stability. A fiscal loosening generating a divergent dynamic of 
public debt could entail, soon or later, the monetization of public debt and, 
consequently, the loss of control of money aggregate and the abandonment of the price 
stability by Central Bank. Indeed if public debt unsustainability had occurred, it have 
had undermined the underpinnings of independence of European Central Bank (ECB) 
in preserving price stability.  
 
2.2. The role of fiscal policy 
With respect to the role for fiscal policy, springing from the FPF-EU, recent research has 
pointed out the new tasks, compared with the old ones, of the fiscal policies.  
Firstly, the FPF-EU rebalances and reassigns the duties between discretionary 
fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers. Indeed the FPF-EU implies a sharp share-out of 
tasks between them. The realization of the mid term target of balance or surplus of 
structural budget should be dominated by the former, while the cyclical stabilization is 
entrusted exclusively with the working of the latter
2. The capacity of automatic stabilizer 
for smoothing out business cycle depends crucially on the nature of the shock hitting 
the economy. Brunila, Buti and in't Veld (2002, 2003) show that with respect of demand 
shocks, automatic stabilizers reacts with different strength according to the fact the 
economy is stricken by a shock to consumption or, differently, by shocks to investment 
and export: the automatic stabilizer are more powerful in the former circumstances than 
in the latter ones. Contrariwise, in presence of supply side shocks, automatic stabilizers 
show their weaknesses since they are ineffective in cushioning the adverse shock.  
The capacity of automatic stabilizers to restrain budget balance from overcome 
the safeguard limit of -3% depends on both the measure of the derivative of total 
                                                 
2  Recently an increasing research has tackled the issue of mainfold causes for restricting the role of 
discretional fiscal policy for stabilization purposes: i) inefficient budgetary decision-making process (long decision 
lags, reining political nature of fiscal decisions; shortsighted governments); ii) destabilizing effects on economic 
activity since discretionary fiscal policy increase in GDP volatiltiy; discretionary fiscal policy lives up to other 
goals apart stabilization i.e., income distribution and resource allocation (Fatas and Mihov, 2003°, 2003b; Kopits, 
2001; Taylor, 2000).  7
budget balance with respect to GDP – which in average in EU is equal to 0,5 (European 
Commission, 2002) – and the starting point of budget balance. Actually assuming that 
the potential GDP growth rate is equal to 3% and that a structural budget balance 
equal to 0% corresponds to it, whether the actual GDP growth rate was equal to -2% it 
follows that the total budget balance should be equal to -2% i.e., greater than the 
safeguard value of -3%.  
Artis and Buti (2000) try to sketch a policy guideline in order to quantify the 
correct dimension of the structural budget balance in order to automatic stabilizers 
work fully without infringing the ceiling of -3% and conclude that the FPF-EU target is 
“roughly right” with respect to their role of stabilization. Leeftink (2000) maintains a 
more favourable attitude towards the reallocation of goals between discretionary fiscal 
policy and automatic stabilizers. He shows that in presence of uncertainty on fiscal 
sustainability the stringent fiscal rules required by FPF-EU generates a synergy between 
discretionary fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers: the former removing the risk of 
public debt unsustainability allows the latter to exert its full strenght in stabilizing 
output.  
Secondly, the FPF-EU revises the well-established and extensively shared 
procedure for financing the capital account of public budget deficits by public bonds. 
Actually the mid-term provision of close to balance or in surplus implies that the capital 
expenditures has to be financed by an equivalent decrease in primary budget balance. 
Nevertheless especially in front of a slowdown of economic activity which makes more 
stringent the need of complying with the FPF-EU requirement on public budget 
balance, governments could be discouraged from carrying out public investments which 
necessarily will be next generations benefit (de Haan, Sturm and Sikken, 1996; 
Balassonone and Franco, 2000). 
Thirdly, the FPF-EU within the class of discretionary fiscal policy puts strong 
emphasis on structural reform in order to achieve the medium-run target of (structural) 
balanced budget whereas it cautions governments about extemporary measures such as 
creative accounting and extraordinary actions. Nevertheless, even in this case, the more 
close the budget balances are to the limit of -3% the more difficult is for government to  8
undertake structural reforms – such as pension reform – which could produce a 
significant worsening of fiscal position in the short-run and, contrariwise, it could 
deferred the budget balance improvements to the medium and long-term (Razin and 
Sadka, 2003).  
 
2.3. The fiscal rule  
With respect to the fiscal rules established by FPF-EU doubts and scepticism have risen 
to the extent of inducing some scholars to drastic conclusions and harshing label such as 
minor nuisance (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998), an albatross (Canzoneri and Diba, 
1999) or – relatively to the ceiling of 3% on public deficit/GDP ratio – a myth and, 
more brutally, a folly (Pasinetti, 1998). The debate on this issue stretches for different 
routes.  
First, some authors draw up a list of general desirable criteria which concur to 
pick out an ideal fiscal rule and, at the same time, can be used as a benchmark for 
evaluating the fiscal rules of FPF-EU. Kopits and Symansky (1998) have singled out an 
accurate selection of basic and ideal features of fiscal rules: well-defined, transparent, 
simple, flexible, adequate relative to final goal, enforceable and consistent. By 
comparison of fiscal rules of FPF-EU to the above set of criteria, Buti, Eijffinger and 
Franco (2003) reach the conclusion that the former perform, on the whole, quite well.  
A second field of research goes in for finding out alternative fiscal rules which 
could replace or implement the FPF-EU ones. Buiter (2003) summarizes and contrasts 
the EU fiscal rules with the most significant alternative fiscal rules that have been 
proposed in the literature and/or that actually are applied in some countries: namely the 
“Permanent Balance Rule” – proposed by Buiter and Grafe (2003) – that basically is a 
tax-smoothing rule where taxes are a constant share of GDP and the “Golden Rule” 
that allows governments to borrow only to accumulate public capital and not to finance 
current public expenditures. Indeed Buiter (2003), after having written down the “ten 
commandments” for fiscal rules – following closely Kopits and Symansky's (1998) 
footsteps –, concludes that the Golden Rule and the Permanent Balance Rule are more 
satisfactory than the FPF-EU fiscal rule since the former keep a large numbers of  9
commandments with respect to the latter.   Thirdly,  another  area  of  enquiry  has 
investigated whether the fiscal rules of FPF-EU are adequate in fulfilling its constitutive 
objective i.e., public debt sustainability. In other words, it has wondered about what 
intermediate fiscal variable – among those under government's control i.e., public debt, 
primary budget balance or total budget balance – is more suitable for ensuring the 
attainment of the final goal. 
Pasinetti (1998, 2000) affirms that the definition of public debt unsustainability 
has to be shaped on the public debt dynamic. By maintaining that debt sustainability 
requires public debt to reduce or to remain constant he reaches a quite paradoxical 
result i.e., during the nineties while Italy and Belgium have achieved a sustainable fiscal 
position other countries such as Germany and France have shown a unsustainable one.  
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001a, 2001b, 2002) after stressing the difficulty in 
identifying theoretically an adequate and, at the same time, simple fiscal discipline that 
ensures public debt sustainability (in their language the presence of a Ricardian regime), 
nevertheless, are able to obtain from the intertemporal budget constraint a general 
criterium for evaluating fiscal rules. Indeed they first deduce a government's reaction 
function based on the adjustment of primary budget balance to public debt change that 
ensures intertemporal budget constraint to be satisfied. Then they show that as long as 
the coefficient measuring the degree of reaction of primary budget balance to public 
debt is positive infinitely often than the fiscal policy guarantees public debt 
sustainability. Finally they conclude that the numerical fiscal rule imposed by FPF-EU 
indeed satisfies their criterium so that it turns out to be a sufficient condition for 
sustainability of fiscal position.  
Fiorito (2002) suggests an alternative fiscal rule that should give a higher flexibility  
to the SGP and, furthermore, should integrate the goal on public debt. According to 
Fiorito’s proposal the maximum reference value of public budget balance for a given 
country should be obtained inversely to the level of public debt: the lower the public 
debt is, the higher the reference value should be.  
Kopitz (2001) keeps an intermediate position between Pasinetti and Canzoneri et 
al.. Starting from a strong definition of public debt sustainability grounded on a  10
reduction of public debt to a predetermined level, Kopitz determines the level of 
primary budget balance that in each period allows to guarantee the fulfil of the final 
goal.  
In conclusion, in the literature there is no a broad agreement on effectiveness and 
adequacy of the fiscal rule but, instead, a negative attitude. Even the more favourable 
conclusion of Canzoneri et.al. – which prove that the reference value of 3% is sufficient 
condition for public debt sustainability – leaves the open question if there exist other 
simple and adequate fiscal rules that could fulfil the same final goal without generating 
negative effects. On the other hand the alternative fiscal rules that are proposed are not 
persuasive – such us that relying on the dynamic of public debt proposed from several 
scholars – not easy to apply and therefore to verify – such us the Permanent Balance 
Rule – or not fundamentally alternative to those of FPF-EU such as the Golden Rule. 
  
3. Adequate Fiscal Rule for Public Debt Sustainability 
In this section we first trace a simple theoretical framework for examining the adequacy 
of the numerical fiscal rule defined by the FPF-EU and, accordingly, we develop a 
simple diagrammatical instrument to carry out our analysis. Of course, the adequacy of 
a policy rule has to be assessed with respect to the realization of the final goal that 
commands the adoption of the policy rule itself. Therefore, the first step in working out 
the analytical framework consists in finding a definition which approximate more 
closely the definition of sustainability of public finance position since FPF-EU has not 
really provide one. We can safely presume that sustainability of public finance position 
means simply public debt sustainability. 
  
3.1 The Definition of Public Debt Sustainability   
In the literature the definition of public debt sustainability is actually a well-established 
topic (Blanchard e Fischer, 1989; Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann e Sartor, 1990; 
Hamilton e Flavin 1986).  
Let us first consider the current or flow government public budget constraint at 
































t s  is the total budget balance/GDP ratio equal to the primary budget balance 
(defined as difference between revenues and expenditures), 
p
t s , minus the interest 
payments,  1 )) 1 /( ( − + t d i γ ,  t d  is the public debt/GDP ratio, γ  is the nominal rate of 
growth of GDP and finally i is the nominal rate of interest
3. Equation (1) says that the 
total budget balance has to be financed by a change in the stock of public bonds and/or 
by growth dividend on public debt.  
Note that for simplifying the analysis we make three hypotheses. Firstly, 
government and Central Bank are consolidated so that we do not consider explicitly the 
money financing and therefore we do not discuss as public debt unsustainability reflect 
in the long-run on the level of price. Secondly, we do not break down the primary 
budget balance between the capital budget balance and the current budget balance. 
Thirdly, the primary budget balance is not decomposed in the two functional 
components i.e., the discretionary fiscal policy and the automatic stabilizer. Actually by 
removing the above assumptions, one would obtain a more general version of the 
current government budget balance, expressly: 
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t s  is the capital budget balance; the current budget balance, 
c
t s , is broken down 
in the discretionary fiscal policy component, 
c s0, and the automatic fiscal stabilizer that 
depends, according to a given reaction coefficient α on the gap between the actual and 
the potential GDP growth rate, 
* γ ;  θ  is the growth rate of the stock of money 
determined by the Central Bank exogenously and  1 − t m  is the stock of money.  
                                                 
3 From now on, the variables 
g
t s , 
p
t s  and  t d have to be considered as ratios to GDP growth rate even if, 
to make exposition lighter, we do not specify that.  12
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The intertemporal budget constraint in the interval  ) , 0 ( N can be derived from (3) – 
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Assuming that  γ > i , so that the intertemporal budget constraint is binding, from (4) it 
follows  
Definition 1. The public debt is sustainable if the public debt grows for  ∞ → N  at a ratio 









































Hence the public debt sustainability requires that the present value of  N d  has to be 
equal to zero for  ∞ → N  or, equally, that the stock of public debt at time  0 = t  has to 
be equal to the sum of the discounted primary budget balance. 
  
3.2 Fiscal Rule Built on Public Debt Dynamic 
Given the high abstractness of definition and its scarce immediate applicability one 
could wish to look for a simple fiscal rule which, in addition to satisfy (5), owns the 
property to be clear and immediate. Of course, there are not many fiscal variables 
standing for fitting this purpose: public debt, total budget balance and primary budget 
balance. 
First, let us verify whether by observing the dynamic of public debt or by 
computing its limit it is possible to find out the proper and adequate solution of the 
above issue
4. Definition 1 implies that public debt is sustainable as long as one of the 
                                                 
4 Pasinetti (1998, 2000) and Harck (2000) discuss the issue of the significance of reference values of the 
Treaty of Maastricht assuming as a starting point a narrow definition of public debt sustainability i.e., public debt  13
following conditions occurs: i) public debt diverges to infinity at a growth rate less than 
that of the discount rate; ii) public debt converges to a finite value. 
The convergence of public debt to a finite value is compatible with the existence 
of a finite limit less or greater than the initial stock of public debt: in other words the 
convergence is compatible both with an increase and with a decrease in the public debt. 
From the two general cases which single out sustainable growth patterns of public debt 
it follows 
Corollary 1. If  0
<
> ∆b  then public debt can be sustainable or unsustainable. 
Corollary 2. If  0 = ∆b  then public debt is sustainable. 
Corollary 1 asserts that public debt sustainability can be supported by a public debt 
diverging to  ∞ + . This claim although points out an interesting theoretical outcome – 
since it is not a result so evident – on a normative ground it could proved to be quite 
dangerous and costly. Indeed it could expose policy makers to temptation in running 
permanent and increasing public deficits and, consequently, it could feed policy makers' 
hopes that public sector have free lunch at its disposal. On the other hand, it points out 
that, on a theoretical ground, the decrease in public debt is neither necessary nor 
sufficient condition for sustainability: indeed as long as the public debt decreases at a 
growth rate greater than that of the discount factor, in absolute value, the condition (5) 
is never satisfied. Corollary 2 shows that a constant public debt is a sufficient condition 
for public debt sustainability although it is not necessary since according to Corollary 1 
the public debt theoretically speaking could run to infinity. 
Altogether Corollaries 1-2 show that the attempt to identify powerful necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the sustainability of fiscal position in terms of public debt 
dynamic is unsuccessful. Specifically, in presence of an increase in public debt they are 
not able to conclude whether the fiscal position is sustainable or unsustainable. Indeed 
they allow to isolate a sufficient condition seen as intrinsically weakly discriminating: as 
long as the public debt is constant or the limit value of public debt is finite, than the 
financial fiscal position is certainly sustainable. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
has to reduce or remain constant, and, consequently, they identify a narrow class of fiscal policies that support 
public debt sustainability.  14
  
3.3 Fiscal Rule Built on Constant Total Budget Balance 
An other opportunity in finding simple indicators for the sustainability of fiscal position 
is given by examining the specific fiscal discipline chosen by policy makers which lead 
to adoption of a fiscal rule in defining economic policy plans. The fiscal rule in this 
simple context necessarily involves the way how the two intermediate fiscal variables 
i.e., total and primary budget balance, which are policy makers' disposal are ruled by 
them. The fiscal rules among the manifold features have to be simple, adequacy and 
consistent. 
A first element that concur to make simple a fiscal rule is the temporal interval on 
which it has to apply for guaranteeing public debt sustainability that is it can be 
uniperiodal or pluriperiodal. Of course a fiscal rule which applies to at every period is 
better of one that requires the verifiability on an extended temporal interval and 
therefore it could involve complex computations as, for instance, the requirement (5) 
claims. Another element that contributes to simplicity regard with the functional nature 
of fiscal rule: in other words the fiscal rule can be a function or, on the other hand, can 
be represented simply by a number that it must be satisfied each period as the fiscal rule 
of FPF-EU does. 
Proposition 1. A constant total budget balance is a sufficient condition for public debt 
sustainability. 
Let us suppose that the Government chooses a fiscal rule which maintains the total 
budget balance constant at the level 
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Given the fiscal rule (6), the current budget constraint (3) can be rewritten in the 
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From (7), it follows straightforward that condition (5) – ensuring public debt  15
sustainability  – is satisfied
5. Indeed the fiscal rule based on a constant total budget 
balance implies an adjustment of primary budget balance in each period according to 



















Therefore according to Woodford's (1995) terminology the fiscal rule based on a 
constant total budget balance defines a non-Ricardian regime or, equivalently, in 
Canzoneri et. al.'s (2001a, 2001b) terminology a fiscal dominant regime: primary budget 
balance are adjusted continuously in order to sustain the fiscal rule and, consequently, 
the public debt sustainability. 
Let us now consider the long-run implications of the above fiscal rule in terms of 
public debt and primary budget balance. From the general solution of the finite 
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Equations (9) and (10) say that: i) the limits of public debt and primary budget balance 
rely exclusively on the exogenous variables i.e., the constant level on which the total 
budget balanced is fixed and the GDP growth rate; ii) given the GDP growth rate, once 
one fixes the total budget balance on a constant value, therefore, the limits of public 
                                                 


















































which it follows that for  +∞ → N  the condition (5) is satisfied. 
6 Indeed in the discussion on the “old” fiscal theory of the price level stated by Sargent and Wallace 
(1981) the role of the fiscal rules satisfying the intertemporal budget constraint and therefore the public debt 
sustainability has been already examined by McCallum (1984).  16
debt and primary budget balance are necessarily obtained by (9) and (10) respectively; 
iii) from equation (10) it follows that the less GDP growth rate and greater interest rate 
are, the greater primary balance budget has to be in order to ensure the stabilization of 
public debt on the selected value. 
Let us now put on the above analysis diagrammatically in FIG. 1. Equation (9) 
identifies the TD schedule given by all combinations of public debt and total budget 
balance allowing public debt to remain constant. The slope of TD is equal to 
) 1 /( γ γ + − , which is a measure of growth dividend: the rate of growth of GDP 
represents an implicit tax since it reduces, given the stock of public debt, the ratio of 
public debt. Equation (10) identifies the PD schedule given by all combinations of 
public debt and primary budget balance which make public debt constant. The slope of 
PD is equal to  ) 1 /( ) ( γ γ + − i and represents the interest payments on public debt net of 
growth dividend. Finally the angle formed by the schedules PD and TD is equal to 
) 1 /( γ + i , so that in correspondence of a given level of public debt, the distance between 
the two schedules represents the interest payments on public debt. 
  
[] 1   FIGURE  
 
Let us assume that at time  0 = t  the public debt is 
A d0 , the total balance budget is 
g s0, 
and the primary balance budget is equal to 
A p s
/
0 , so it cannot cover fully interest 
payments. Hence the public debt has to increase. Moreover let us assume that at  1 = t  
policy makers decide to adopt a fiscal rule that fixes the total budget balance 
permanently at the level of period  0 = t . In the following periods, the increase in 
interest payment, consequent upon the increase in public debt, implies an increase in 
the primary budget balance along the schedule SP, which represents the primary budget 
balance adjustment function (8), in order to keep the total budget balance constant at 
the level fixed in advance. The public debt increases as far as the primary budget 
balance starting from point B reaches finally the point E and the public debt stabilizes at 
0 d . When public debt reaches the limit value, the sum of the growth dividend, equal to  17
the segment  0 Gd plus the primary budget balance, equal to the segment  0 Ed , are fitted 
for covering exactly the interest payments, equal to the segment EG. 
On the other hand let us assume that at time  0 = t  the public debt is 
B d0 while the 
primary balance budget is, 
B p s
/
0 , and let us suppose that the government at  1 = t  forces 
itself to follow a fiscal rule requiring a constant total budget balance at the previous 
level, 
g s0. In these circumstances, the initial level of primary budget balance leads to a 
decrease in the public debt which, given the constant total budget balance, implies a 
decrease in interest payment which, in turn, produces in the following period a decrease 
in primary budget balance along the SP schedule in order the total budget balance to 
remain constant. Finally the public debt approaches at the limit  0 d  where it stops to 
decrease since the primary budget balance offsets exactly the sum of the interest 
payments net of growth dividend. The two above examples imply 
Corollary 3. The public debt sustainability supported by a fiscal discipline resting on a 
constant total budget balance is consistent with both an increasing and decreasing public 
debt. 
Corollary 4. A fiscal discipline resting on a constant total budget balance implies that there 
exist infinite combinations  ) , (
g s d which ensure public debt stationarity. 
Therefore Corollary 3 reminds that from observing the dynamic of public debt we 
cannot infer anything about the public debt sustainability. Corollary 4 says that all 
combinations  ) , (
g s d  on the TD schedule guarantee the stationarity of public debt. 
Given the stationarity of total budget balance, whatever the starting point  ) , (
g s d  is, the 
public debt converges necessarily to a finite value. 
  
3.4 Fiscal Rule Built on Constant Primary Budget Balance 
The third and last intermediate fiscal variable, that could be chosen as reference variable 
in determining the fiscal rule, is represented by the primary budget balance. As we have 
seen previously Canzoneri et. al. (1999, 2001a) have shown that it is possible to identify 
the basic requirement for obtaining a broad class of fiscal policies that support a  18
Ricardian regime: the coefficient which measures the reaction of primary budget 
balance has to be “positive infinitely often”. 
The intuition behind the finding is quite immediate: in order to avoid 
unsustainable public debt patterns governments have to retire public debt so as to avoid 
the occurrence of a divergent growth of public debt. Nevertheless as Canzoneri et. al. 
say “the response might be every other year, every decade, or every century”. Of course, 
this, in turn, reveals the weakness of the proposed fiscal rule. Opportunistic 
governments could postpone the adjustment of primary budget balance in following 
period and maybe in the next century! Actually, the requirement for public debt 
sustainability found out by Canzoneri et. al. (1999, 2001a) seems to be a criterium for 
evaluating fiscal rules rather than a fiscal rule itself. 
  Let now check briefly if a fiscal rule based on a constant primary budget 
balance bring about public debt sustainability. 
Proposition 2. A constant primary budget balance is not a sufficient condition for public 
debt sustainability as long as it is fixed on a value 


















Actually Proposition 2 shows that there exists an unique value, among the infinite ones, 
on which the primary budget balance can be fixed for ensuring public debt 
sustainability i.e., the value given by (10): the primary budget balanced is fixed exactly 
on that value that allows to finance the interest payment net of growth dividend. Hence 
with the exception of this value all the other values are not able to support the 
sustainability of public debt. 
  Using Woodford's (1995) terminology the fiscal rule based on a constant 
primary budget balance defines a non-Ricardian regime or, equivalently, in Canzoneri et. 
al.'s (2001a) terminology a monetary dominant regime: primary budget balance are not 
adjusted every period so that public debt is unsustainable and consequently soon or 
later Central Bank has to adjust the stock of money for guaranteeing the fiscal solvency. 
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4. The Social Burden for Supporting the Fiscal Rule 
SEC. 3 has shown that a simple and adequacy functional fiscal rule for ensuring an 
immediate or gradual stabilization of public debt lays in fixing a constant total budget 
balance. The arithmetic of the budget balance constraint, nevertheless, on the one hand 
supplies a simple guidelines for conducting fiscal policy while, on the other hand, leaves 
a large degree of irresoluteness since it cannot provide a criterium for choosing the 
correct and fair value on which the fiscal rule has to be fixed. Indeed as we have seen 
there exist infinite values of total budget balance that satisfy the condition (5) and 
therefore are equivalent for ensuring public debt sustainability. 
  At the same time, SEC. 3 has pointed out that the stabilization of public debt 
implies necessarily a continuous adjustment of the primary budget balance along the 
convergence process. In turn, the size and the sign of the primary budget balance 
reveals the degree of public debt burden carried on by the current generations where 
the public debt burden has two components i.e., taxes required for interest payments 
and taxes required for retiring the stock of public debt. 
  Firstly, in the presence of a primary budget deficit the current generations 
finance both interest payments and part of the current expenditures by public bonds 
and therefore both shift entirely the burden of public debt – in terms of interest 
payments – to next generations and furthermore make the burden even heavier since the 
public debt has increased further. Secondly, when there is a surplus of the primary 
budget two circumstances can happen. On the one hand, if the primary budget balance 
is positive – but less than the interest payments – the public debt has necessarily to 
increase. Therefore the actual public debt burden falls partially on the current 
generations and partially is shifted forward to the next generations. On the other hand if 
the primary budget surplus is greater than the interest payments it means that public 
debt is reducing and therefore the current generations sustains a public debt burden 
constituted by two elements: the interest payments and the retirement of the stock of 
public debt. The effort of the present generation is of benefit of future generations. 
Indeed the next generations because of the reduction of public debt will carry a smaller 
burden than the previous ones. Thirdly, if the primary budget surplus is exactly equal to  20
interest payments than the public debt remains constant and the burden of public debt 
remain constant and equal intergenerationally. 
  In order to clarify the relation between the fiscal rule and public debt burden 
consequent to its adoption, let us consider two countries that lie on different point of 
the TD schedule in FIG. 2. For instance let be country A in point  ) , (
* g
A A s d A = , while let 
be country B in point  ) , (
* g
B B s d C =  – where 
* *
B A d d <  – and let us assume that in the two 
countries the GDP growth rates and interest rates are equal and, furthermore, that the 




A s s > . Now let us suppose 
that the two countries are requested to converge to an identical value, for instance, 
*
0 d , 




B A d d d < <  so that they have to adopt the same numerical fiscal 
rule so as to keep constant the total budget balance at 




A s s s < < 0 . Therefore, the country A – bears a public debt burden – equal to the 
segment 
*
A Md  – less than that of country B – equal to the segment 
*
B Sd  – since its public 
debt is less than that of country B. 
 
[] 2   Figure  
  Let us see how the burden for supporting the fiscal rule changes along the 
convergence process of public debt to 
*
0 d . On the one hand, since 
*
0
* d d A <  and 
g g
A s s 0 >  
the country A in the first period achieves a decrease in the primary budget balance and, 
consequently, in public debt burden. In FIG. 2 this results in shifting primary budget 
balance from point M to N, and, accordingly, in shifting the total budget balance from 
point A to B. Subsequently, because of the decrease in total budget balance, public debt 
increases. This, in turn, implies that in the following periods the primary budget balance 
has to increase in order to ensure the financing of the interest payments since the total 
budget balance has to be kept constant permanently. In these circumstances the public 
debt burden, afterwards a temporary initial decrease, starts to increase steadily: when 
public debt reaches the limit 
*
0
* d d A = , the public debt burden is greater than the initial 
one.  21
  On the other hand, since 
*
0




B > , the country B has to produce in 
the first period an increase in the primary budget balance and consequently in the 
public debt burden. Graphically this means that firstly the primary budget balance 
increases passing from point S to point R so as to satisfy the constraint imposed on the 
total budget balance that shifts from point C to point D. Secondly, the decrease in total 
budget balance entails the reduction of public debt and, consequently, the reduction of 
interest payment. This in turn produces the decrease of primary budget balance along 
the schedule SP from point R to the limit value E. Finally when the limit value of public 
debt is reached, the public debt burden results less than that of the initial period. 
  By comparing the two convergence processes of public debt of two countries it 
follows that the fiscal adjustment requiring an identical limit value of public debt in 
country  A implies an increase in public debt and, consequently, an increase in the 
public debt burden while in country B it produces a decrease in public debt and 
consequently in the public debt burden. Nevertheless during the entire period of 
adjustment towards the new public debt limit the public debt burden in country A is 
always less than that of country B. 
  In conclusion, the adoption of a fiscal rule based on a constant total budget 
balance and the consequent fiscal adjustment imply necessarily an intergenerational 
redistribution of the burden of public debt. The direction and the size of the 
redistribution crucially depend on two basic elements: the specific value on which the 
total budget balance is fixed and the gap between the actual public debt and the limit 
public debt coherent with the prefixed numerical fiscal rule which it could be both 
positive and negative. The smaller the required level of total budget balance and the 
larger the positive gap between actual and limit public debt are, the bigger is the 
increase in public debt burden on current generations and the smaller the public debt 
burden on future generations are. 
 
5. The Consistency of Fiscal Rules of FPF-EU 
This section deals with the issue of the consistency of the fiscal rules on total budget 
balance with the final goal on public debt established by FPF-EU. As we have seen the  22
Stability Pact has tightened the fiscal rule on the total budget balance provided by the 
Treaty of Maastricht since there is a shift both of the reference value from -3% to 0% 
and of the reference variable from the current to the structural total budget balance. On 
the other hand the final goal on the public debt has remained unchanged i.e., public 
debt has to be equal or less than the critical value of 60%. 
  Let first examine the consistency between the fiscal rule of  % 3 − ≥
g
t s  and the 
final goal of  % 60 ≤ d  that the Treaty of Maastricht provided for membership to EU. 
[] 1   Table   
 
TAB. 1 calculates the limit of public debt in correspondence of different values on 
which total budget balance is kept constant and different GDP growth rates. Actually 
each column of TAB. 1 is the numerical expression of the schedule TD considered in 
SEC. 2 and therefore it confirms, in another way, that there exist infinite combinations of 
total balance budget and GDP growth rate to each of those corresponds a finite limit 
value of public debt. Therefore it reasserts the arbitrariness of the reference values 
selected by MT in order to ensure the sustainability of public finance position of 
members of EMU. Actually the theoretical findings do not provide definitive indications 
that a total budget balance less or equal to -3 is better than one equal to -2 or -4 for 
assuring the sustainability of public finance position; analogously it does not say 
anything whether a public debt equal to 60% is better of one equal to 40% or 80%. In 
other words the reference values established by MT is a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for ensuring the sustainability of public finance stance. 
 The  arbitrariness of the reference values of -3% fixed from MT does not 
represent a real shortcoming. In other words, given the right functional fiscal rule i.e., 
the constancy of total budget balance, whatever numerical reference value the MT had 
have chosen it had been arbitrary. Actually TAB. 1 points out the real weakness of the 
MT. Actually, it shows that assuming  % 3 − ≤ s  the reference value on public debt 
% 60 ≤ d  can be achieved simultaneously only if  3 , 5 ≥ g . This comes out directly from 
observing equation (11) which identify the limit of public debt: since three variables 
appear in (11) i.e., 
g s ,  d  and g  it is straightforward that it is not possible to  23
predetermine two variables at a given value e.g.,  ) , ( d s
g , without bearing in mind that a 
third variable has necessarily obtained from (11). As a consequence the MT suffers of an 
inconsistency between the fiscal rule regulated on the total budget balance and the 
reference value on public debt on the interval  3 , 5 ≤ g  For instance, assuming that  3 = g , 
the policy makers even if fulfil in each period the target  3 − = s , will be never able to 
achieve the reference value on the public debt since in these circumstance the limit 
value of public debt/GDP ratio is equal to 100%. 
  The SGP has modified the numerical fiscal rule by entailing countries to reach 
medium-term budget close to balance or in surplus, that is  % 0 ≥
g s  where 
g s  in this 
case represents the structural total budget balance while, on the background, there still 
remains the final goal on public debt i.e.,  % 60 ≤ d . TAB. 1 says that the SGP overcomes 
the shortcoming undermining the MT, that is the inconsistency between fiscal rule and 
final goal within a given interval of GDP the growth rate: as long as the total (structural) 
budget balance is constant on  % 0 =
g s  therefore the limit of public debt is  0 = d . In 
other words by tightening fiscal rule SGP makes the limit of public debt independent by 
the GDP the growth rate. At the same time it shows that indeed the underlying final 
goal of the FPF-EU is represented by a single value rather than by an interval as the MT 
has stated previously and the SGP has reaffirmed implicitly. In conclusion the 
overcoming of inconsistency of the MT with regard to this point implies a very strong 
result in the long-run: government has to retire public debt completely. 
  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have focussed on a single aspect of the fiscal policy framework deriving 
by the combination of the fiscal requirements of MT with those of the SGP which has 
been under attack recently: the fiscal rules. Specifically we attempt to verify the 
soundness of the fiscal rule with respect to its two basic features: the adequacy and 
consistency relatively to the final goal of the sustainability of fiscal position. The main 
results are the following ones. 
  First it points out that as long as the definition of public debt sustainability is  24
derived from the intertemporal budget constraint the theoretical findings point out that 
a simple functional fiscal rule ensuring the final goal consists in keeping constant the 
total public budget balance. Therefore the numerical fiscal rule of FPF-EU indeed can 
be seen as specific drawn from the correct functional fiscal rule and therefore it 
represents a simple and adequate fiscal rule for fulfilling the final goal. Furthermore it is 
necessarily arbitrary since on the theoretical ground it is not possible to discriminate 
which specific value is more adequate or better for public debt sustainability: therefore 
there exist infinite values on which the total budget balance can be fixed for ensuring 
the sustainability of public debt. 
  Second, although the numerical fiscal rule of FPF-EU which is obtained from 
the functional fiscal rule is indifferent for fulfilling the final goal, the other hand, it 
produces alternative effects on the redistributions of public debt burden. Actually the 
paper shows that the direction and the size of redistribution rely on two basic factors: 
the peculiar value on which the total budget balance is maintained constant and the gap 
between the actual and the limit of public debt. The smaller the required level of the 
total budget balance and the larger the positive gap are, the bigger is the increase in 
public debt burden on the current generations and the smaller that falling on the next 
generations. 
  Thirdly, it points out that the fiscal rule based on the reference value of 3% 
required by the Treaty of Maastricht is inconsistent for a given set of values of GDP 
growth rate with the final goal which imposes the public debt to be less than the 60%. 
Finally it shows that the further refinement carried out by Growth and Stability Pact – 
imposing structural total budget balance to be equal to 0% – indeed removes the above 
inconsistency as long as the interval of the final goal shrinks to a single point i.e., zero, 
so that in the long period the public debt has to be retired entirely. 
  Finally, the analysis shows that the fiscal rule provided by the FPF-EU is 
indeed adequate and consistent for fulfilling the public debt sustainability. Indeed it 
points out that the calibration of the fiscal rule on total budget balance rather than 
public debt is the best choice in defining a fiscal discipline coherent with public debt 
sustainability. As a consequence some recent reform suggestions of FPF-EU proposing  25
shifting the emphasis from total budget balance to public debt dynamic are not strongly 
grounded on theoretical findings. On the other hand the analysis shows that a 
significant shortcoming of the fiscal rule – that in the literature has been scarcely 
stressed – concerns the size and the timing of intergenerational redistribution of public 
debt rising from satisfying it. Actually the requirements that impose in the medium term 
structural budget to be close to balance and in the short term the actual budget does not 
to overcome the limit of -3% could entail a public debt burden too heavy on the current 
generations that, in turn, could generate a rejection of the FPF-EU by European 
countries especially if the structural budget and/or public debt are far form the 
respective goals. Actually to be too impatient in reaching the sustainability of public 
finance position could turn out to be a dangerous boomerang and could produce a 
complete and problematic rejection of the FPF-EU. As a consequence an improvement 
of the FPF-EU relatively to the fiscal rule could consist in fixing both the priority 
between the constraints on the structural and the actual budget balance and the period 
within which they should be satisfied. At first, countries should be required to fulfill the 
goal on the structural budget – so that countries should not be pushed in adopting 
creative policy measures – and only subsequently the limit of -3% should become 
operative. The spread of the requirements on budget balance in two phases and in a 
given predefined period (such as the Treaty of Maastricht did with reference to the 
convergence criteria) would own two advantages: firstly it could distribute the public 
debt burden on a larger number of generations and, secondly, it could ensure the 
respect of the ceiling on the actual budget balance of -3% by relying on the fiscal 
stabilizers rather than on the discretional fiscal policy how it could be happen whether 
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GDP Growth Rate 0,5 1,7 3 3,5 4 5 5,3 6 7 7,1 8 9 9,1 10
Total Budget Balance
-11 2211 658 378 325 286 231 220 194 168 165 149 133 132 121
-10 2010 598 343 296 260 210 200 177 153 150 135 121 120 110
-9 1809 538 309 266 234 189 180 159 138 135 122 109 108 99
-8 1608 479 275 237 208 168 160 141 122 120 108 97 96 88
-7 1407 419 240 207 182 147 14 124 107 105 95 85 84 77
-6 1206 359 206 177 156 126 120 106 92 90 81 73 72 66
-5 1005 299 172 148 130 105 100 88 76 75 68 61 60 55
-4 804 239 137 118 104 84 80 71 61 60 54 48 48 44
-3 603 179 103 89 78 63 60 53 46 45 41 36 36 33
-2 402 120 69 59 52 42 40 35 31 30 27 24 24 22
-1 201 60 34 30 26 21 20 18 15 15 14 12 12 11
0 00000000000000  
 
Table 1. Limit Values of Public Debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 